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A DECADE OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE 
Late-Ming Factional;sm in the Making, 1583-1593 
BY 
JIE ZHAO* 
University of Southern Maine 
It has been long held that, although the Ming dynasty collapsed in 
1644, the dynastic fate had been sealed much earlier. The compilers 
of Ming shih pronounced that "the Ming dynasty actually foundered 
under [the Wan-li gX emperor (r.1573-1620)].''l They considered 
Shen I-kuan t R (1531- 1615), the senior grand secretary of the 
late Wan-li period, to be one of the principal contributors to the Ming 
decline. Some of them maintained that the dynasty fell apart primarily 
due to factionalism, and factionalism began with Shen. 
Wan Yen g > (1637- 1705), himself a compiler of Ming shih, dis- 
agreed with this assessment. He acknowledged Shen I-kuan's impact 
on the last few decades of factionalism, but he argued that Shen Shih- 
hsing Ep t(1535-1614) and Wang Hsi-chuch ES(1534-1611) 
had started it.2 Wan's observation pointed to a decade (1583- 1593) 
* I would like to thank the Department of East Asian Studies at Princeton Uni- 
versity for support from its research fund and access to the Gest Library in the 
summer of 2000, and the Harvard-Yenching Institute for providing access to its 
library facilities. I am greatly indebted to Professor Craig Dietrich for his advice 
and editing in the course of preparing this paper for publication. 
1 Ming shih, ch. 21, p. 295. For complete citations see the bibliography at the 
end of this article. 
2 In Wan's analysis, Wang Hsi-chueh was the shrewdest of all, followed by Shen 
Shih-hsing. Shen I-kuan, who came after them, was less astute, but much more ag- 
gressive than Shen Shih-hsing; after he had used vicious tactics to force out his rivals 
his notoriety surpassed that of his two predecessors. Wan Yen's view is recorded in 
Ch'uan Tsu-wang's Chieh-ch'i t'ing-chi, wai-pien, ch. 19, p. 919. Shen I-kuan's rivals 
were Shen Li itX(1531-1615) and Kuo Cheng-yu FiEX(1554-1612). For his hos- 
tility toward these two men, see Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, Mu-chai ch'u-hsueh chi, ch. 51, pp. 
1289-1292. Incidentally, while some scholars have suggested that late-Ming faction- 
alism had direct roots in the so-called Great Ritual controversy that took place at 
the beginning of the Chia-ching reign (1522-1566), this remains a subject of de- 
bate. Therefore I would like in this essay to step aside from this viewpoint and 
(C) Brill, Leiden, 2002 T'oung Pao LXXXVIII 
Also available online- www.brill.nl 
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A DECADE OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE 113 
that marked a political juncture in the late Ming. This period deserves 
closer attention. It witnessed the end of Chang Chii-cheng's q2K )r
E authoritarian but effective administration and the beginning of 
increasing discord which eventually paralyzed the central government. 
The senior grand secretaries Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chuieh 
undoubtedly contributed to this discord, as Wan said. But the evidence 
shows that the reality was much more complex, with two other 
elements, the Wan-li emperor and the opposition, helping to inflame 
factionalism. 
Under what circumstances, then, did the situation begin to shift? 
Why did things change to such a degree that factionalism overwhelmed 
the government? To address these questions we must first consider 
two powerful men, T'ai-tsu j*4 tf (r.1368-1398), the founder of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), and Senior Grand Secretary Chang Chui- 
cheng (1525-1582), who both cast enormous hadows over the political 
developments of this decade. 
Living with Tai-tsu's Legacy 
The institutional disintegration was the unintended consequence 
of the vision of T'ai-tsu, the man who set the despotic tone for Ming 
governance. As is well known, the dynastic founder was determined 
to keep the bureaucracy subordinate to the throne and abolished 
the prime ministership.3 As the burden thereby forced upon the throne 
was too much for later emperors, the Grand Secretariat gradually 
assumed many of these responsibilities. Lacking formal executive 
powers, the senior grand secretaries faced the perpetual dilemma 
of, in the words of Charles Hucker, "how to become a prime minister 
under a system that did not permit a prime ministership."4 
Another feature of T'ai-tsu's institutions came from his realization 
that his descendants' misrule might jeopardize the dynasty. He estab- 
lished a set of strict rules and mechanisms to prevent the throne from 
focus on the political struggles during the decade 1583-1593, which I believe set 
the stage for the chronic, destructive factionalism that eventually crippled the Ming 
dynasty. 
3 This was in 1380. See Ming shili, ch. 72, p. 1733. 
4 Charles 0. Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement of the Late Ming period," 
p. 139. In light of Hucker's remark, the term "administration" as used in this article 
refers to the senior grand secretary's office and senior ministers and censors. Although 
administrations technically "headless", like the grand secretariat, did not exercise 
formal executive power, they nevertheless controlled the decision-making process 
and submitted their recommendations to the emperor for final approval. 
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disrupting governmental operations. For instance, the emperor was 
not expected to initiate policy, and supervising secretaries of the Six 
Offices of Scrutiny, part of the censorial-supervisory branch of the 
government, were empowered to veto imperial decisions.5 As Char- 
les Hucker explains, "Although the civil-service establishment was 
legally restricted to advisory rather than legislative powers, the nor- 
mal administrative routine gave it some significant procedural checks 
on imperial irresponsibility or arbitrariness. The right to make final 
decisions was always the emperor's, but the civil servants normally 
prescribed the alternatives among which the emperor could choose."6 
Against this background, Chang Chiu-cheng was probably the only 
senior grand secretary in the Ming who acted somewhat like a prime 
minister. He was able to run the government in a heavy-handed fashion 
mainly because the Wan-li emperor was still a boy, and his mother, 
the Empress Dowager, allowed Chang to discipline her son strictly.7 
The deep resentment the emperor vented after Chang's death as a 
consequence reaffirmed the despotic intimidating power of the throne.8 
The passing of Chang Chiu-cheng in 1582 unsettled the government. 
His opponents, who had been suppressed by his administration, 
clamored for redress of their grievances. The Wan-li emperor, who 
was now an adult, exploited anti-Chang resentment to condemn his 
stern former tutor's leadership style, purge his clique, and confiscate 
his family property.9 Chang's policies were abandoned by grand 
secretaries who were eager to disassociate themselves from their 
5 Ming shih, ch. 74, pp. 1805-1806. Also see Charles 0. Hucker, T-he Censorial System 
of Ming China, pp. 100- 102. 
6 Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, p. 42. 
7 Yu Shen-hsing, Ku-shan pi-chu, ch. 2, p. 16; p. 19. Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-luie, 
ch. 1, pp. 18-19. 
8 YU Shen-hsing, ch. 2, pp. 19-20; ch. 4, p. 42. 
9 Chang Chu-cheng's authoritarian presence at court and intolerance of criti- 
cism reached a peak in 1577 when Chao Yung-hsien Xi )(1535-1596), Wu Chung- 
hsing %tIj(1540-ca. 1598), Shen Ssu-hsiao it: J (1542-1611), Ai Mu X fZ (cj. 
1558), and Tsou Yuan-piao N T (1551-1624) criticized him for not observing the 
mourning of his deceased father. Their memorials infuriated the senior grand secre- 
tary; they were, as a result, flogged and cashiered. See Wen Ping, ch. 1, pp. 38-44, 
and Hucker, "The Tung-lin movement of the late Ming period," pp. 139-140. 
This harsh suppression of his critics generated more anti-Chang resentment. Shortly 
after Chang's death, his opponents condemned the previous administration with 
a vengeance. With imperial connivance the purge went overboard, causing the 
suicide of Chang's eldest son. See Hsu Hsiieh-mo, Kui-yu-yuan kao, ch. 19, 126/12. 
Wu Yuian-ts'ui, Lin-chil man-lu, ch. 6, pp. 312-313. Wen Ping, ch. 1, pp. 68-69. 
T'an Ch'ien, Kuo-ch'iieh, ch. 72, p. 4479. 
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predecessor'". Few could then foresee that this reaction would have 
serious repercussions. 
The Wan-li emperor, Chang Chu-cheng's opponents, and the Grand 
Secretariat all maneuvered to align the administrative offices to their 
own advantage. Both the emperor and Chang's opponents feared 
that the power of the Grand Secretariat might easily slip into the 
hands of a senior grand secretary again. To prevent this, they teamed 
up to weaken that office. Their concerted denunciation of the deceased 
grand secretary sent a chilling message to his successors, and effectively 
ended the practice by which a powerful senior grand secretary do- 
minated the central government. "I The Grand Secretariat's authority, 
as a result, was significantly reduced in favor of the emperor: no grand 
secretaries after 1582 ever risked standing up to him.'2 But the em- 
peror's victory did not bode well for the long-term health of the dynasty. 
The Grand Secretariat, beginning with Senior Grand Secretary 
Shen Shih-hsing, found itself on the defensive. It was difficult to operate 
in such hostile political climate, when anti-Chang resentment and 
the emperor's suspicion of the Grand Secretariat were at a peak. 
However, soon the emperor and the opposition started to clash on 
policy and administrative issues, and their strained relationship pro- 
vided opportunities for Shen to moderate the emperor's hostility.'3 
Shen Shih-hsing had to balance effectiveness against survival. Ef- 
fective administration required a strong leadership, which would surely 
provoke the emperor. Mediation between the emperor and his col- 
leagues, always placating the throne, would foster his own survival. 
Not a risk-taker, he played the role of mellow housekeeper. He indulged 
the emperor and swayed him to his side, gaining the leverage necessary 
to deal with the opposition. The consequences of his choice were by 
no means trivial. The mechanisms the Grand Secretariat had once 
used to manage the emperor were now brushed aside.'4 This was 
10 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 72, p. 4441, 4448. The grand secretaries T'an referred to 
were Chang Ssu-wei PiV El T` (1526-1585) and Shen Shih-hsing. Also see Ch'ien Ch'ien- 
i, ch. 30, p. 895. 
1 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming-Ch'ing chih-chi tang-sheyun-tung k'ao, pp. 12-14. 
12Mingshih, ch. 218, p. 5768. 
13 As the focus of attention at court shifted from the purge to the issue of balanc- 
ing power among many other administrative concerns, a growing number of junior 
officials found themselves in the opposition challenging the emperor and the Grand 
Secretariat. The term "Chang's opponents" no longer adequately applies to this pressure 
group. From this point onwards, therefore, I shall use the word "opposition" instead. 
1'4 WIVan-li shu-ch'ao, Ts'ai Shih-ting's memorial, 58/259. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 83, p. 
5155. 
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just one of the institutional practices that eroded quickly during Shen's 
tenure as senior grand secretary (1583-1591). 
Under T'ai-tsu's shadow, the management of state affairs had been 
balanced uneasily between the throne and the Grand Secretariat, 
and between the Grand Secretariat and the ministries. The decade 
1583-1593 saw this balance undone as Chang Chu-cheng's legacy 
and T'ai-tsu's institutions bedeviled the relationship between the Wan- 
li emperor, the Grand Secretariat, and the opposition. Tension grew 
between the emperor and the opposition, each offering conflicting 
interpretations of T'ai-tsu's rules regarding imperial power and its 
limitations. Meanwhile, the opposition called for the Grand Secretariat 
to relinquish control over the six ministries, using T'ai-tsu's intent 
as their justification. Thus, the emperor bent the Grand Secretariat 
to its knee and the opposition tried to free the six ministries from the 
Secretariat's interference. Pressured from both sides, Shen Shih-hsing 
used their conflicting interests of the emperor and the opposition to 
further his ends. The entanglement of this triad gradually undermined 
the government, taking it to uncharted territory, with ominous im- 
plications for the future. 
Obstreperous Emperor 
The Wan-li emperor, after 1582, "rapidly degenerated into a self- 
indulgent and irresponsible despot."'5 The remaining thirty-eight years 
of his reign witnessed the full exhibition of his unbridled character: 
aloofness from government affairs, volatile temper, and extravagance.'6 
His isolation deepened his suspicion and distrust of officials, creating 
a vicious cycle in which he raged against outspoken critics, cut off 
communications with the government, and unleashed eunuchs as his 
special agents in the ruthless pursuit of wealth, thereby generating 
still more criticism. 7 One scholar-official lamented that the emperor's 
15 Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, p. 153. 
161n a memorial from 1600, Wang Te-wan voiced his concerns about the Wan- 
Ii emperor's huge expenditures, which caused fiscal tightness and a drastic reduction 
of the defense budget. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/282-285. 
17 L. C. Goodrich and Fang Chaoying, eds., Dictionagy of Ming Biography, account 
of the Wan-li emperor by Charles Hucker, pp. 324-337. Ray Huang, "Fiscal Admin- 
istration during the Ming dynasty," p. 113. Also see Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., The 
Great Enterprise, p. 11. It should be pointed out that Ray Huang presents a more sym- 
pathetic picture of the Wan-li emperor in his 1587, A rear ofNAo Signzficance, pp. 1-41, 
93-95. 
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desire ran rampant at the cost of his people's flesh and blood, leaving 
them impoverished and putting the state in great peril.18 
All of these problems began to surface as early as in 1585. One of 
the alarming indicators was the emperor's withdrawal from his imperial 
duties. Study sessions, ceremonies, memorials, and daily audiences 
with officials bored him. Drink, sex, and extravagance gave him 
excitement and pleasure. He remained aloof from government affairs, 
while insisting on his right to ultimate power. 
We should not underestimate the importance of imperial study 
sessions, ceremonies, reviewing of memorials, and daily audiences. 
Woven together as a web of restraints, they worked to mold an 
emperor's public persona as a responsible ruler and a man of dignity 
and compassion. These rituals exalted the emperor, but they also 
restrained him, trimming his rough edges and taming his tyrannical 
impulse as far as was possible. Above all, they pressured him to 
maintain a modicum of civility and self-restraint toward his subjects, 
especially those around him. The frightening consequences of an 
emperor's non-compliance were a sufficient impetus for officials to 
urge him to play his assigned roles. Understandably, then, several 
heated controversies at the late-Ming court focused on imperial 
deportment and decorum. 
In a small, isolated world where humble eunuchs and submissive 
grand secretaries kowtowed to him, the Wan-li emperor defied political 
and ethical constraints. He did not encounter much resistance from 
his senior grand secretary: Shen Shih-hsing carefully calculated how 
much risk would be involved if he upset the emperor. The con- 
demnation of Chang Chti-cheng served as a reminder. 
The year 1586 saw the emperor's behavior obstruct the operation 
of the government and his resentment toward criticism harden, when 
the issue of choosing an heir apparent (the so-called Kuo-pen [ 74S 
controversy, which I shall discuss later) began to heat up. Since Shen 
Shih-hsing was reluctant to speak frankly to the emperor and other 
senior officials followed suit, junior officials took on the task of 
confronting him. The "avenues of criticism" (yen-lu i ), an in- 
stitutional mechanism dating from the beginning of the dynasty, 
permitted them to admonish the emperor and senior officials. 19 Wan- 
li's cancellation of study sessions, official audiences, and ceremonial 
18 Ting Yuian-chien, Tsun-cho-t'ang wen-chi, ch. 1, 170/654-656. 
19 Ta-Ming hli-tzien, ch. 209, pp. 481-489. Also see Ono Kazuko, Minki to'sha ko, 
pp. 166-173. 
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proceedings late that year prompted Lu Hung-ch'un X 4 , a 
secretary of Rites, to submit a critical memorial. 
In his edict, the Wan-li emperor had adduced health problems to 
justify the cancellation. Lu's memorial cited information leaked to 
the public that the emperor had fallen off a horse and bruised his 
forehead, pointing out the contradictions. Whether it was a horse- 
riding accident or dizziness and fatigue,20 he reminded the emperor 
of the consequences of his behavior, using a traditional technique to 
warn the emperor that his misconduct would tarnish his image in 
history: "Your Majesty is observed by the public today, and will be 
judged by future generations... Even if all the officials, intimidated 
by Your Majesty, dared not point out your misbehavior, it would be 
impossible to prohibit such (unfavorable) information from being 
recorded in unofficial histories passing on to later generations." He 
then advised the emperor, "If Your Majesty is really sick, you should 
restrain yourself from pleasure-seeking for the sake of the state. If 
you are not sick, you should maintain truthfulness in your imperial 
edict rather than use an excuse leading to the spread of rumors."'21 
Lu's memorial enraged the emperor. He was flogged and then 
cashiered.22 
By contrast, Shen Shih-hsing carefully phrased his words to the 
emperor at the end of 1587: "Your Majesty only attended a lecture 
once this year. Please pay attention to the study of classics and history 
next spring."23 The emperor cordially thanked his senior grand 
secretary, but the following year he failed to attend a single session. 
Shen submitted the written lectures out of obligation, quietly accepting 
the emperor's absence.24 
The emperor figured that he could force the officials to keep quiet 
about his behavior. In principle, the senior grand secretary should 
counsel him. But Shen Shih-hsing acted as a yes-man; thus it was 
junior officials that the emperor had to deal with. Wan-li thought 
that severe consequences, corporal punishment in particular, would 
silence them.25 Much to his dismay, intimidation did not work on 
Lu Hung-ch'un, and there was no shortage of courageous junior 
20 Lu Hung-ch'un believed that the emperor's indulgence in sexual pleasure prob- 
ably caused fatigue and dizziness. 
21 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 335-339. 
22 Ibid., pp. 339-340. 
23 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 74, p. 4569. 
24 Ibid., ch. 74, p. 4583. Also see Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 
218, p. 5749. 
25 Wang Chia-p'ing, Wang Wen-tuan kung ch'ih-tu, ch. 7, 149/70 1. 
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officials who stubbornly and persistently raised the issues. This agitated 
him immensely. 
Dogged Opposition 
By 1589, the Wan-li emperor's relationship with his officials had 
further deteriorated. Tensions rose over the issue of naming an heir 
apparent. Furthermore, his lavish expenditures contributed to serious 
fiscal tightness, his rare contacts with the administration undermined 
governmental operations, and the flogging of palace eunuchs and 
maids became a frequent and disturbing occurrence.26 The unre- 
strained emperor, a volatile man only in his twenties, disrupted the 
government and committed arbitrary violence to vent his blind rage. 
It was indeed a fearsome thing to reprimand him. But Lo Yu-jen Y 
{ ff (cs. 1583), a commentator in the Grand Court of Revision, came 
forward to do just that. 
In his memorial of 1589, Lo rhetorically assumed the role of a doctor 
diagnosing the sickness and offering a four-point prescription to his 
patient. He began, 
I believe that if a man pursues a government career he ought to speak to the 
emperor with all sincerity. I have been in the capital for more than a year 
now and have only met Your Majesty three times at court. It is said that you 
suffer from an overabundance of fire element inside the body, and fatigue. 
Your Majesty cannot even preside over the state ceremonies such as paying 
homage to Heaven and the imperial ancestors, and has to send officials to 
represent you. For quite a long time Your Majesty has engaged in state affairs 
only rarely, has abandoned the study of classics, and has stopped attending 
lectures. Based on all this, I conclude that the sickness of Your Majesty is 
impossible to cure through normal medical treatment. I am confident that 
my four-point prescription can heal you. The condition comprises heavy 
drinking, sexual pleasure, greed, and volatile temperament. Heavy drinking 
hurts your stomach, concupiscence consumes your energy, greed weakens your 
mental concentration, and hot temper harms your liver. 
Surrounded with delicious delicacies, Your Majesty should restrain yourself 
from drinking too much. To the contrary, you imbibe during the day, not 
satisfied, then continue drinking long into the night. Highly intoxicated, Your 
Majesty is running around unsteadily brandishing knife and sword. It is heavy 
drinking that causes you to stumble. 
Surrounded by consorts and concubines, Your Majesty should restrain 
yourself from too much sex. To the contrary... you have become attracted to 
Consort Cheng and promote her rank lavishly... you spoil her to the point 
of doing whatever she says. As a result, the decision to name the imperial 
26 Ibid., ch. 7, 149/686. 
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heir is postponed again and again. It is sex that makes you indecisive [on 
the issue of the heir apparent]. 
With the whole empire under your command, Your Majesty should uphold 
the virtue of frugality. To the contrary, you repeatedly demand [from the 
government] as much as several hundred thousand taels of silver, and as much 
as several thousand yards of silk. You show no sense of frugality. Furthermore, 
you press your eunuchs to hand in quantities of silver. If they do you are 
delighted; if they don't you are angry and flog them... Clearly, there is a 
problem of greed.27 
Your Majesty beats palace maids and eunuchs daily. If they are indeed guilty 
of misconduct, the law will hold them accountable. Depending on their wrong- 
doing, they should be reproached or dismissed. There is no need to resort to 
corporal punishment to the point of beating them to death. These people live 
close to Your Majesty. If beating to death doesn't fit their offense, severe punish- 
ments are likely to trigger incidents. More seriously, Your Majesty harbors 
resentment and anger towards outspoken officials... They are demoted, 
dismissed or exiled. This is due to your volatile temperament. 
Lo appealed to Wan-li to resume his imperial duties: 
Your Majesty loves drinking. How can you prohibit officials from attending 
drinking parties? Your Majesty loves sex. How can you stop officials from 
excessive indulgence in sexual pleasures? Your Majesty is greedy. How can 
you hold officials accountable for their avarice? And Your Majesty is hot- 
tempered. How can you persuade officials to remain on good terms with each 
other? This disease, manifested in drinking, sex, greed and outbursts, disturbs 
your mind and weakens your body. It is no wonder that you are not well. 
Your Majesty is now in your prime, but you don't attend state affairs at court. 
Once you pass this age, what will you then do about your duties? 
And he concluded, 
What I present here is neither pleasant to your ear nor welcome to your 
heart. But it is the right diagnosis for your sickness. If you accept my advice, 
you will attend state affairs, be close to honest officials, and keep a distance 
from consorts and concubines. Stay away from the four problems, compose 
yourself and meditate. Within half a year, you will become vigorous and healthy 
again.25 
Lo Yii-jen's memorial was a bitter pill for the emperor to swallow. 
During an audience with Shen Shih-hsing he complained: "I am 
criticized for keeping memorials and not sending them back to the 
administration, as those ridiculous memorials claim. The truth of the 
matter is, I am very sick, incapable of reading the memorials under 
27 Wen Ping, ch. 4, pp. 229-303, provides a detailed overview of the eunuch 
commissioners' brutal abuse of power and unbridled pursuit of wealth, which 
according to him inflicted immense damage on society and common people. Chao 
Yung-hsien, Sung-shih-chai chi, ch. 28, 41/442-444. Also see Ray Huang, Taxation 
and Governmental Finance in 1 6th-Centuy Ming China, pp. 7-8. 
28 Lo's memorial is included in Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 469-474. 
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the dim light. This causes occasional slowdowns. Meanwhile, these 
officials, one after another, express their crazy opinions continually. 
I have yet to finish reading one memorial: a second has already arrived. 
They keep attacking each other in their memorials to the point of 
paying no respect to the court etiquette."29 He dismissed Lo's memorial 
as nonsense, but did not go so far as to call it slanderous, no doubt 
for fear of triggering an investigation. 
Lo Yui-jen's courage unsettled Shen Shih-hsing. Flogging Lo, which 
the emperor contemplated, would only draw public attention to the 
vindictive monarch and his compliant administration. It was better 
to hush it up. Shen, therefore, advised the emperor to sequester Lo's 
memorial and dismiss him on the charge of insubordination.30 
In the opposition's eyes these actions breached the ground rules 
of politics. Shen Shih-hsing knew very well the procedure that required 
memorials, after the emperor's review, to be returned to the Six Offices 
of Scrutiny. The Six Offices of Scrutiny were to make copies of 
memorials and imperial edicts and then send them to the appropriate 
ministries. Also, the memorials should be included in the official 
gazetteers to document the political life of the emperor and the ad- 
ministration.31 This procedure had at least two functions: to keep 
the communication between the throne and its officials transparent, 
and to keep them in check. Sequestering critical memorials, known 
as "liu-chung" I 4i, aimed to purge objectionable materials from the 
official record. The emperor henceforth did this repeatedly. He 
"pigeonholed memorials in the palace and refused to make decisions 
even on appointments, so that large numbers of offices fell permanently 
vacant and much governmental business could not be carried out at 
all. "132 
Not surprisingly, the "avenues of criticism" became a battleground. 
The opposition fought to broaden them, defending its right to scrutinize 
the emperor and the Grand Secretariat. The other side attempted 
to constrict them, for which purpose the accusation "insubordina- 
tion" (ch'u-wvei l) was another handy device. Junior officials who 
29 Ibid., p. 483. 
30 Ibid., p. 483. Also see IlVan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/244. In 
reviewing Lo's case, the Slting shili compilers agreed witlh the late-M/ing critics that 
Sheni's advice, i.e., sequestering memorials, provided the emperor the means to cut 
off communicationis with the officials. Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 
218, p. 5749. 
T-1 Ta-Ainlg hlei-tdeni, cli. 213, p. 526. MVing shi/l, ch. 74, pp. 1805-1806. 
` Hucker, The Censorial System of lVling Clzina, p. 43. 
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asserted their institutional right to speak out were charged with this 
infraction. They saw this as censoring their tongues and blocking 
the "avenues of criticism."33 
Shen Shih-hsing's subservience won the emperor to his side. The 
two realized that they had more in common than not, and both found 
the opposition irritating. Thus they often teamed up to suppress the 
other side. Yet far from cowing the opposition, sequestering memorials 
and preferring charges of insubordination only stoked its outrage 
against what it saw a gross violation of principles, and often triggered 
confrontation. 
The two sides had collided over a dispute between senior officials 
in the Nanking administration in 1586. In that year, Fang Huan P- 
aV, Education-intendant Censor at Nanking, submitted a memorial 
accusing Left Censor-in-chief HaiJui l5 (1513-1587) of incompe- 
tence, rigidity, and hypocrisy. Fang was believed to have initiated 
this preemptive assault as a defense against Hai Rui's report to the 
central government about his corrupt behavior.34 A man of notorious 
dishonesty and cruelty, he smeared Hai whose integrity and character 
were legendary among officials and common people alike.35 Three 
freshmen chin-shih in Nanking, outraged by Fang's shameless attack, 
submitted a memorial to the central government demanding his im- 
peachment.36 Rather than conduct a fair inquiry, the administration 
sheltered Fang and discharged the three young men for "insubordi- 
nation."37 Shortly afterwards, the Censorate issued a new regulation 
requiring the directors of all departments in both capitals to tighten 
their supervision over newly appointed chin-shih/.38 These actions sent 
33 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/352-353. 
34Ibid., Hsii Ch'ang-chi's memorial, 59/99-100. Fang Huan was affiliated with 
the circle of the senior grand secretary. Hsu Fu-tso, a native of Su-chou, made a 
harsh indictment of Fang Huan's conduct. He cited a pamphlet, written and circu- 
lated by Su-chou students, which exposed Fang's abuse of power, brutality, and 
corruption. See his Hua-tang-ko ts'ung-t'an, ch. 3, pp. 10a-12b. 
35 Ho Ch'iao-yuian, Ming-shan ts'ang, 427/273-279. Wu Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 7, pp. 
327-329. Hsia Hsieh, Ming t'ung-chien, ch. 68, pp. 2679-2680. Also see Goodrich 
and Fang, Dictionagy of Ming Biography, account of Hai Jui by Chaoying Fang, pp. 
474-479. 
36 One of these three memorialists was Ku Yuin-ch'eng R R (1554-1607), Ku 
Hsien-ch'eng's R Aj; (1550-1612) younger brother. Considering the elder brother 
an active member of the opposition, the administration suspected that it had or- 
chestrated this move and therefore deemed the memorial nothing but another partisan 
attack. This memorial is included in Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/94-99. 
37 WU Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 8, p. 368. 
38 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 326. Also see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 73, p. 4538. 
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a message to all junior officials that the administration would not 
tolerate their frank expression of views. 
This case infuriated the opposition. Shen Ssu-hsiao it , i (1542- 
1611), a well-known opposition figure, submitted a memorial citing 
the Ming Statutes and the Ming Code, which clearly stated that officials 
and commoners were both entitled to express their views about state 
affairs. He argued, "The fact that officials of the censorial agencies 
are obligated to speak by no means suggests that officials from other 
branches, as well as commoners, should be prohibited from speaking... 
As long as the issues concern the welfare of the people and the state, 
not only the censors but also other officials, not only senior but also 
junior officials, have the right to speak out." Shen criticized the new 
regulation, saying, "Directors should discipline the freshmen for 
cultivating personal access to the powerful; instead they discipline 
them for speaking the truth. They should teach them to be honest 
and loyal officials; instead they instruct them to bite their tongues 
and shut their mouths." The result, he said, was that the censors and 
senior officials did not speak out for fear of jeopardizing their own 
careers; non-censorial and junior officials, who were not afraid, were 
not allowed to speak out. Shen wondered whether the sanctions would 
serve the interest of the state at all.39 
Grand Secretary Wang Hsi-chuieh, a trusted friend and colleague 
to Shen Shih-hsing ever since he joined the Grand Secretariat in 1584, 
defended the policy on grounds of protecting the senior officials' dignity 
and the court etiquette.40 He insisted: "This is the court; it is not like 
a village where an old man tolerates anyone yelling, quarreling and 
fighting in front of him. If the state indulged this kind of behavior, it 
would harm the state. As for the new regulations, the Censorate made 
them. This has nothing to do with us (Shen Shih-hsing and Wang). 
Besides, it is wrong to remain indifferent to improper conduct without 
reprimand. Yet no sooner is the reprimand issued than we are accused 
of intolerance."'41 
The central government was likened by one scholar-official to a 
quarrelsome law court with endless scandal, dispute, protest, and 
retaliation.42 The Grand Secretariat and the opposition were mired 
39 W1an-li sliu-ch'ao, Shen Ssu-hsiao's memorial, 58/470-472. Wen Ping, ch. 2, pp. 
134-138, describes the clash between the Grand Secretariat and the opposition over 
the Hai-Fang case. 
40 Shen Shih-hsing, S'su-hsien-t'ang chli, ch. 9, 134/193. 
4 Wang Hsi-chiieh, Wang Wen-su kung ch'uian-chzi, ch. 9, 135/668. 
42 Wang Chia-p'ing, ch. 7, 149/699. 
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in partisan wrangling and mutual torment.43 Wang Hsi-chiieh com- 
mented on court politics in a letter to the effect that "The tendency 
at court these days is that whatever accusers say must be true and 
whatever defendants say must be false."44 In another letter, he de- 
scribed the court as crowded with "hungry hawks."45 Wang, in other 
words, implicitly acknowledged that the opposition had won the 
popularity contest. Its aggressive presence was a reality he and his 
allies had to reckon with. 
The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, discussed later 
in this essay, controlled the decision-making process. While the ac- 
tive members of the opposition were either forced out of government 
or blocked from promotion,46 the opposition's strength came from 
its ability to criticize. Its relentless charges stripped the Grand Secre- 
tariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance of public faith in its trustworthiness, 
competence, and fairness, and in the character of its members. 
The opposition did not stop at submitting official memorials, how- 
ever. It also boosted public awareness through devastating pamphlets, 
satire, and fiction. For example, when the examination scandal of 
1588 described below intensified, an anonymous broadside entitled 
"The exile's appeal for justice" appeared in Nanking, a hotbed of 
active oppositionists. Rhetorically, it put the powerful suspects on 
"public trial" in the southern capital. Peking banned circulation of 
this pamphlet.47 Against this background, it is not hard to understand 
why the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance felt itself 
preyed upon by hungry hawks. 
Rancor over Examinations 
In this charged atmosphere, everything and anything could raise 
suspicion or evoke a heated dispute, followed by attack and counter- 
attack; character assassination became routine.48 These activities 
43 Tung Fen, Mi-yuan chi, ch. 8, p. 4a. Wen Ping, ch. 2, p. 123. 
44 Wang Hsi-chueh, ch. 13, 136/55 
45 Ibid., ch. 9, 135/673. 
46 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 25, 41/389. Also see Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, ch. 62, p. 1470. 
47 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4612. 
48 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Chao Nan-hsing's memorial, 59/360. In this memorial, Huang 
Hung-hsien and several other officials who were closely associated with the circle of 
Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chueh were accused of attacking Shen Ssu-hsiao, 
Wu Chung-hsing and Chao Yung-hsien and forcing them out of government. This 
memorial is included in Chao's Chung-yi-kung shih-wen chi, ch. 19, 68/567-570. Huang 
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resulted in ever deepening resentment. Although the Grand Se- 
cretariat could severely punish antagonists, repression strengthened, 
rather than weakened, the opposition. Bold memorialists gained 
tremendous reputations as courageous heroes, holding the moral high 
ground while they risked their careers and lives. Their ability to in- 
fluence public opinion and attract support among the educated served 
as their weapon against those who flouted the norms of conduct. 
Political ethics and ideals, especially at a time of growing corruption 
and abuse, retained their importance in politics and public life. 
Civil service examination scandals implicated the powerful, providing 
the opposition with ammunition. Such scandals had occurred from 
time to time throughout the second half of the Ming dynasty.49 But 
never before had power and money compromised so frequently and 
outrageously the process of grading and final decision-making, espe- 
cially at the metropolitan and provincial levels.50 Frustration and 
distrust toward the examinations ran high among candidates. 
In 1588, the results of the metropolitan chui-jen examination stirred 
up rumors and public outrage in the capital because the candidate 
who received the highest distinction was none other than Wang Heng 
X tgf, the son of Wang Hsi-chuieh. Li Hung W %, another new chu- 
jen, was Shen Shih-hsing's son-in-law. There were several other 
privileged sons whose examination success raised eyebrows. In fact, 
rumor mongers in the capital had predicted the outcome prior to 
the official announcement. It had been an accurate forecast. The 
opposition wasted no time in probing the scandal. Kao Kui t 
(cs. 1577) and Yu K'ung-chien tTh+(cs. 1580), two officials from 
the Ministry of Rites, took the initiative. 
Kao Kui was the first to submit a memorial challenging the results 
and calling for an investigation of deals involving the Chief Exami- 
ner, Huang Hung-hsien N ,", and the two grand secretaries.51 
Hung-hsien's son Huang Ch'eng-hsuan (cs. 1586), on the other hand, charged the 
other side with using the 1588 chu-jen examination to smear his father. See the bio- 
graphical account he wrote for his father, Ou-meng-t'ang chi, ch. 10, pp. 18b- 19a. 
49 See Wen Ping's account of the examination scandals under the Wan-li reign, 
ch. 1, pp.70-85. 
50 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Wang Ssu-mei's memorial, 59/481-483; Ts'ai Shih-ting's 
memorial, 58/253. Also see Hsu Fu-tso, ch. 5, pp. 32a-38b. 
51 Huang Hung-hsien was a Han-lin academician and the right mentor of the 
Secretariat of the Heir Apparent. He was a close associate of Shen Shih-hsing and 
Wang Hsi-chueh. He married his daughter to Wu P'eng's 4 11N grandson, his grand- 
son to Tung Fen's F fi} great-granddaughter, and his granddaughter to Shen Shih- 
hsing's grandson. See Huang Ch'eng-hstian, ch. 10, p. 24a. For information about 
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He said he had dismissed the rumors until errors in the essays by 
the implicated candidates and the disappearance of other candida- 
tes' essays caught his attention. This constituted sufficient evidence 
to warrant an investigation.52 The administration responded by 
demoting him three ranks.53 
This response prompted Yu K'ung-chien to action. He stated in 
his memorial that he had been assigned to review the essays and had 
reported to the minister of Rites and the chief supervising secretary 
of Rites, pointing out suspicious signs.54 When they took no action, 
Kao Kui turned in his memorial. Yu went on to say, "Speaking out 
frankly can establish one's reputation, but it can also bring one trouble. 
Weighing reputation and risk, it is human nature to avoid the latter 
as far as possible... But I cannot bear to stay away from trouble 
while another person (Kao) takes the heat alone." Because of his 
report, Yu said, he had been "bombarded with the Su-chou faction's 
slanders and with the two grand secretaries' reproaches." The Censo- 
rate had joined in against Yu and Kao as well. "Instead of questioning 
the examiners' involvement in the scandal, the censors blamed us 
for ruffling a few feathers; and instead of investigating the back-door 
connections of these candidates, they scolded us for being reckless."55 
Enormous pressure forced the administration to resolve the crisis 
by ordering eight new chu-jen to retake the test, and appointing a 
review panel chaired by Left Censor-in-chief Wu Shih-lai H K . . 
Wu's clash with the opposition was inevitable.56 According to Yu 
K'ung-chien, this crisis could have been resolved had Wu rendered 
his opinions based on the quality of the candidates' essays. Instead 
he sided with the two grand secretaries and the chief examiner.57 
Wu P'eng and Tu Fen, see Jie Zhao, "Ties that Bind: The Craft of Political Net- 
working in Late Ming Chiang-nan," pp. 138-144. 
52 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Kao Kui's memorial, 59/483-486. One of the offices in Shun- 
t'ien prefecture where the examination essays were kept had been burglarized. 
About fifty essays, hand-copied in red ink by the clerks, were missing as a result. 
This incident aroused the opposition's suspicion. Although the original essays, in 
black ink, existed, there was no way of telling whether or not they were compro- 
mised since the red-ink ones had been stolen. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 418-419. Wen 
Ping, ch. 1, p. 75. 
53 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 435 
54 The minister of Rites was Chu Keng * Fi (1535-1609) and the supervising 
secretary was Miao Ch'ao-yang, both affiliated with the senior grand secretary, who 
chose to ignore Yu K'ung-chien's report. Yu Shen-hsing's account, ch. 8, pp. 93- 
94, supports Yu K'ung-chien's assertion. 
55 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 435-437. 
56 Shen Te-fu, Wan-liyeh-huo pien, p. 1291. 
57 Yi K'ung-chien, ru Ching-su hsien-sheng shan-chiu kao, ch. 1, pp. 3a-3b. Yu Shen- 
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Wu's decision to pass all the essays led to a third memorial, this 
time byJao Shen PA fF3 (cs. 1583). Jao charged that chief examiner 
Huang Hung-hsien had placed Wang Heng first to please Wang's 
father and had passed Li Hung to please his father-in-law, despite 
inevitable public outrage. "People were so angry that they wanted 
to spit in Huang Hung-hsien's face and beat him on the back." As 
for Wu's evaluation, "I learned that some of the candidates were 
incapable of composing decent essays. Wu Shih-lai, chief of the 
Censorate, simply accepted all of the essays as fine. Kao Kui argued 
with him, but he shamelessly insisted upon his judgement. This scandal 
began as a poorly conceived theft and ended up as a blatant robbery; 
it began with one person cheating, and ended up with the whole faction 
cheating."58Jao's rebuke cost him terribly. On behalf of the emperor, 
the administration threw him in prison, where he was subjected to 
interrogation and torture and nearly beaten to death. He was later 
deprived of his official status.59 
Huang Hung-hsien submitted nine memorials to the administration 
vehemently denying all the charges. To Kao's charge, he responded 
that past examination scandals were exposed by actual evidence. If 
evidence was insufficient, there were at least plenty of suspicious traces 
to substantiate the allegations. Never until now had accusations been 
based on blind prejudice and a few words picked up from the essays. 
Huang then insisted, "Since (Kao) Kui alleges bribery, he should 
present the facts as to who offered the bribes, who received them, 
who passed the money to whom, and who witnessed when and where 
the pay-off took place. Confronted with actual evidence, I and other 
examiners can come forward to testify." 
As for the prominent backgrounds of the candidates, Huang argued 
that all the names were concealed and the examiners read not the 
original essays, but the ones hand-copied by the official clerks. "Were 
Kao Kui the chief examiner, could he possibly tell which essays were 
written by a person of humble origin and who therefore should be 
passed, and which essays were written by a person of official back- 
hsing did not affiliate himself with either side. As a member of the review panel, his 
observations shed a critical light on Wu Shih-lai's attempt to pass all the essays in 
order to please the two grand secretaries. Yii Shen-hsing, ch. 8, pp. 93-95. Wan-li 
shu-ch'ao, Wang Chi-kuang's memorial, 58/354; Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 59/488- 
489. Wen Ping, ch. 1, p. 77. 
58 TWlAan-li shu-ch'ao, Jao Shen's memorial, 59/487-488. 
59 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 438. W/Van-li s u-ch'ao, Ts'ai Shih-ting's memorial, 58/253. Also 
see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4597. 
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ground and who therefore should be excluded? Besides, the officer 
in charge of keeping the examination essays distributed them to the 
examiners, and then a group of examiners read and graded all the 
essays... With such procedures, I dared not and could not engage 
in any illegal deals." 
As far as the essay errors were concerned, Huang said that opi- 
nions differed on literary style and taste. "What (Kao) Kui approves 
does not necessarily deserve approval, and what he disapproves does 
not necessarily deserve disapproval. It is impossible for me or any 
other examiners to tailor our opinions to Kui's. Furthermore, it is 
easy to find flaws, but difficult to compose essays. Kui should have 
remembered his own experience in the provincial examination. Is it 
reasonable to demand perfect essays? Is it fair to make a bribery charge 
based on a few flaws?" 
In conclusion, Huang defended his integrity. "I come from a family 
that has served the government for a few generations with a clean 
conscience. I am not a beggar. Who in the world would be so insane 
as to take such a risk in order to ingratiate himself with the grand 
secretaries, who don't abuse power, and to take a few stinking coppers 
from fellow provincials?"60 
In another memorial Huang responded toJao Shen's charge. "(Jao) 
Shen laid out three charges against me. First, Wang Heng, son of 
the Grand Secretary, should not be placed first. Given that the can- 
didates' names are concealed and the essays handed to us are hand- 
copied by the clerks, it is the quality of the essays that counts. Wang 
Heng's remarkable intelligence has been nationally recognized ever 
since he was a child. Even Kao Kui acknowledges his talent." It was 
a unanimous consensus among fourteen examiners as to which were 
the best essays. "When we opened the seal, we saw the name of Wang 
Heng. Is it right for me to disregard his essays for the sake of keeping 
a distance from power? His essays are now widely circulated with 
high praise. Is Jao) Shen the only man who doesn't know about it? 
On reexamination, Wang Heng took the brush and finished the essays, 
thousands of words, right away." As to the second and third charges 
involving Li Hung and several other implicated candidates, Huang 
maintained that his colleagues passed their essays; and he respected 
their decisions.61 
The administration's harsh punishment of Kao Kui andJao Shen 
invited even louder protests from the opposition. The opposition was 
60 Huang Hung-hsien, Pi-shan hsiieh-shih chi, ch. 8, 30/248-250. 
61 Ibid., ch. 8, 30/252 
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convinced that Huang Hung-hsien had abused his power as the chief 
examiner to make a big profit. One memorial claimed that the 1588 
metropolitan chui-jen examination had been turned into a market where 
the price tag for the chui-jen degree was 5,000 taels of silver.62 Another 
suggested that Huang's decision to place Wang Heng first was cal- 
culated to seek Wang Hsi-chtieh's support for Huang's appointment 
as a grand secretary. And he counted on Wang's protection if the 
scandal was exposed.63 
Above all, this dispute inflicted deep personal wounds on both sides. 
The opposition's probing came at the price of demotion and dismissal. 
Huang Hung-hsien paid even more dearly. He took sick leave and 
never returned to government service; his ambition to join the Grand 
Secretariat withered. The examination scandal cast a shadow over 
his reputation for the rest of his life.64 Wang Heng postponed taking 
the metropolitan examination until after his father had left office. 
Wang Hsi-chuieh, infuriated by the allegation against his son, became 
more confrontational against the opposition.65 
Weighing the dispute carefully, it is probably fair to say that the 
men in the opposition had a tendency to parade their righteousness 
and were all too eager to expose corrupt senior officials. Their question- 
ing of Wang Heng's placement did not advance their position and 
only gave Huang Hung-hsien an opening to repudiate their charge 
and ignite Wang Hsi-chtieh's temper. On the other hand, Huang's 
emphasis on the examination procedures did not allay suspicion. If 
these procedures had indeed been inviolable, as Huang claimed, 
examination scandals should never have arisen. In fact, it cannot be 
doubted that the examination system was corrupt; power and money 
compromised the process of grading and decision making.66 As one 
memorialist pointed out, even Huang's colleagues in the Han-lin 
Academy frowned at the result of the examination, which, in their 
view, did not smell right.67 
62 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Wan Tsu-yue's memorial, 58/363. 
63 Ibid., Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 59/489. Also see Yu K'ung-chien, ch. 1, p. 
4a. 
64 WU Yuian-ts'ui, ch. 8, p. 360. 
65 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Li Wan's memorial, 59/30. Ming shih, biography of Wang Hsi- 
chueh, ch. 218, p. 5751. 
66 Hsi! Fu-tso, ch. 5, pp. 38a-b, describes the cheating techniques employed by 
corrupt examiners and by the clerks who hand-copied the examination essays. 
67 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Wan Tsu-yuie's memorial, 58/363. 
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The Kuo-pen Controversy 
Not surprisingly, the opposition's call for reforms fell on deaf ears. 
As the decade 1583-1593 came to an end, Chao Yung-hsien L 
! (1535-1596), a prominent opposition figure, expressed pessimism 
about the future. He saw major crises looming, problems requiring 
administrative and judicial improvements, financial and tax reforms, 
and frontier defense strengthening, among many other concerns.68 
Through all of this, the famous Kuo-pen stalemate continued to poison 
the political atmosphere.69 As is known, the year 1586 set the stage 
for the controversy. It was triggered by the emperor's promotion of 
Lady Cheng to the rank of imperial consort shortly after she bore 
him a son.70 The emperor's elder son, whose mother was originally 
a humble palace maid, was already five years of age, but he had 
received no loving attention from his father. A neglected child, his 
vulnerability was increased as Consort Cheng aspired to make her 
own son heir apparent.7' He was innocently unaware that a contest 
between him and his newly born half-brother had begun. The battle 
pitted the Wan-li emperor and Consort Cheng against the opposi- 
tion. The latter insisted that the emperor should name the elder son 
heir apparent, as required by the "Ancestral Precepts" of the Ming 
(Huang-Ming tsu-hsiin * H)J tff -)If) established by the dynastic founder. 
The controversy could have been avoided if the Wan-li emperor 
had followed T'ai-tsu's rules. According to the rules, as the opposi- 
tion pointed out, naming an heir apparent in a judicious and decisive 
manner assured a smooth succession. If the empress failed to produce 
a male child, the vacancy should be filled on the basis of seniority.72 
The emperor was expected to make his decision at the earliest pos- 
sible time. In most previous cases the heir apparent had been chosen 
at age five or six and had immediately begun his formal education 
under Han-lin academicians.73 
The Wan-li emperor insisted that the precepts preferred the em- 
press's son as heir apparent. Therefore, he wished to wait a few years 
to see whether his youthful empress would produce a boy.74 He totally 
68 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 29, 41/460. 
69 Shen Te-fu, p. 27 1. 
70 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 73, p. 4527. 
71 Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5749. 
72 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/225. 
73 Ibid., 58/227. Ray Huang, 1587, A rear of No Significance, p. 43. 
74 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 742. 
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ignored the fact that his own father, the Lung-ch'ing gX emperor 
(r. 1567-1572), had named him heir apparent while the empress was 
still young and his own mother was a consort. The Wan-li emperor 
had little affection for his empress; he simply used her as a pretext to 
postpone the decision. Behind this delay lay a palace conspiracy 
allegedly masterminded by Consort Cheng to elevate herself one day 
to the rank of empress, legitimizing her son as heir apparent. 75 After 
years of strong pressure from his officials, the emperor in 1591 
reluctantly agreed to name his successor in two years.76 
But the Wan-li emperor had established a pattern of making and 
then breaking promises. To ensure that he would not waver this time, 
the opposition submitted two requests: the eldest imperial son should 
begin his formal education at once, and the Ministry of Rites should 
start preparations for his investiture. The emperor reacted with rage. 
Meng Yang-hao i - >, the Left Supervising Secretary of Reve- 
nue, in turn responded in a memorial that "Education and the 
announcement of heir apparent are not two separate issues. Since 
the naming is scheduled, why is it forbidden to educate the eldest 
imperial son now? If his education is blocked today, how could it be 
otherwise when the time for naming arrives?"77 For these remarks, 
Meng was flogged and cashiered.78 
While protests, floggings, and dismissals continued, Shen Shih-hsing 
wavered. He occasionally expressed his concerns to the emperor on 
behalf of the administration, but he distanced himself from the dis- 
pute itself. The emperor's behavior eventually prompted two grand 
secretaries, Hsu Kuo nF I (1527-1596) and Wang Chia-p'ing E 
J)r (1537-1604), to submit a memorial on behalf of the Grand 
Secretariat urging him to honor his latest promise.79 It upset him. 
Shen Shih-hsing, on sick leave at the time, told the emperor in a 
secret memorandum that this step had been taken without his knowl- 
edge. "It is Your Majesty who shall choose the heir apparent. Don't 
let this talk confuse you."80 The memorandum became public, reveal- 
ing the cunning character of the man. The opposition accused him 
of selling out his two colleagues and compromising correct principles 
751Hsia Hsieh, ch. 68, pp. 2671-2672. 
76 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 584. 
77 Ibid., p. 630. 
78 Ibid., p. 632. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4665. 
79Tan Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4657. 
80 W'an-li ti-ch'ao, p. 587. 
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to ingratiate himself with the emperor.8' Embarrassed, Shen was 
forced to resign that same year.82 
The year 1593 saw Wang Hsi-chtieh, the emperor's choice as se- 
nior grand secretary, take charge of the administration.83 He assumed 
the office during a nervous waiting period for the emperor's delivery 
on his promise. The Ministry of Rites asked the emperor for instruc- 
tions concerning the ceremonies for the announcement of the heir 
apparent, but received none.84 
The positions of the emperor and of the opposition were irre- 
concilable. Wang Hsi-chueh could not resolve the deadlock. To support 
the opposition, even though it was institutionally the right thing, was 
a recipe for losing imperial patronage and putting his career on the 
line. Besides, it was the emperor who had made him the top man, 
whereas the political wounds inflicted on him by the opposition were 
still smarting. At any rate, his first priority was to look after his own 
interests. Anticipating a bumpy road ahead, he carefully crafted his 
advice to the emperor so that the latter understood his meaning, while 
its ambiguity and evasiveness left no clear evidence for his opponents 
to use against him. 
Wang Hsi-chueh and the emperor exchanged confidential me- 
morandums that set the stage for an imperial announcement. Wang's 
memorandum stressed that the choice of heir apparent rested with 
no one but His Majesty; a slip of paper from His Majesty would settle 
81 It was customary in the Grand Secretariat that the grand secretaries bowed to 
the authority of the senior grand secretary. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's me- 
morial, 58/243. Chao I, Er-shih-er shih cha-chi, ch. 33, p. 483. There were few occa- 
sions when grand secretaries found some channels to vent their views, as is seen in 
the memorial submitted by Hsu Kuo and Wang Chia-p'ing in the absence of Shen 
Shih-hsing. The Wan-li emperor usually kept the secret memorandums in the pal- 
ace, but he deliberately returned Shen's to the Grand Secretariat to humiliate Hsu 
and Wang. The memorandum was a slap in their faces. The two grand secretaries, 
instead of keeping the memorandum in their office, sent it to Lo Ta-hung, the su- 
pervising secretary of the Ministry of Rites, who was bound to release it to the public, 
thereby putting Shen Shih-hsing on the spot. In an attempt to minimize the damage, 
Shen sent a clerk to Lo's office to "borrow" the memorandum, but he refused to 
return it when Lo came to pick it up the next day. This prompted an angry memo- 
rial from Lo. See Lo's Tzuyiian wen-chi, 139/509. His memorial is also included in 
Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/33-35. Lo was demoted to county clerk in a remote region as a 
result. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 593. 
82 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 600. Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5750. 
T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, pp. 4657-4658. 
83 Yueh Yiian-sheng, Ch'ien-ch'u-tzu wen-chi, ch. 5, p. 3a. 
84 YU K'ung-chien, ch. 1, p. 12a. 
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the issue right away. Any difficulty that might arise from the emperor's 
decision, Wang wrote, would be left to him, Wang, to deal with. For 
all its ambiguity, this struck a chord with the emperor and boosted 
his confidence. In his reply, the emperor, who now had three sons, 
insisted that T'ai-tsu's precepts gave priority to the empress's son 
and therefore decided to postpone the appointment of the heir ap- 
parent in order to wait for his empress to produce an heir. He would 
instead bestow upon his three sons the title of prince, a scheme known 
as San wangppingfeng--I X Mtt He asked Wang to draft an imperial 
edict to this effect. Wang immediately complied. He wrote in an 
attached memorandum that his majesty had appropriately balanced 
principle with personal feeling. The edict was sent to the Ministry of 
Rites with a directive that the ministry should arrange the necessary 
ceremony.85 
Even though the emperor emphasized that his decision was con- 
sistent with T'ai-tsu's precepts, his critics found serious flaws in his 
interpretation. Guessing that what was really on his mind was the 
installation of the son of Consort Cheng, they argued that only when 
an emperor had no male children and the heir apparent was selected 
from a cadet family, was there a strict provision that the candidate's 
mother must be the prince's principal wife. Otherwise, the precepts 
dictated that if the empress did not have a son, the heir apparent 
must be decided on the basis of seniority.86 The Wan-li emperor had 
taken this provision out of context and twisted it to his needs. 
Anticipating strong objections from his officials, the Wan-li emperor 
skipped any court discussion and proceeded to announce his decision. 
It was even more troubling to many officials that Wang Hsi-chuieh, 
the only person consulted by the emperor, assisted him in sidestepping 
the succession rules.87 The opposition demanded a reversal. Some 
kept vivid accounts of their intensive lobbying, their protest via 
memorials, and their confrontation with Wang Hsi-chueh in his of- 
fice: these accounts offer an extraordinary glimpse of the strained 
relationship between the emperor and his officials. 
Thus, when nine junior officials marched to Wang Hsi-chtieh's 
85 Yueh Yuian-sheng, ch. 5, pp. 3a-4a. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 751-755. Also see Ming 
shih, biography of Wang Hsi-chuieh, ch. 218, p. 5752. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4692. 
86 Yueh Yuan-sheng, ch. 1, p. 6a. Also see Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Shih Meng-lin's 
memorial, 58/225-226; Chang Cheng-kuan's memorial, 58/223-224; and Ku Hsien- 
ch'eng's memorial, 58/239-241. 
87 Yueh Yuian-sheng, ch. 1, pp. 20a-20b. Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Chang Na-pi's memo- 
rial, 58/228-229. 
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office,88 Yueh Yuian-sheng 
-2- E E recalled that Wang was angry 
and raised his voice several times over the course of their conversa- 
tion. Yueh raised his voice as well and said to Wang: "There is no 
alternative but that we officials pressure you, Sir, to tell the emperor 
to retract his decision." Wang responded: "Then I must report your 
names," to which Yueh answered: "Put my name first. The interest 
of the state is at stake. It is worth flogging, exile, demotion or dismissal, 
so long as the decision is overturned."89 
In the end Wang Hsi-chiieh yielded to the pressure and submitted 
a memorial apologizing for his misunderstanding of the succession 
rules, and asking the emperor to retract his decision.90 The emperor 
replied to his senior grand secretary, "You have admitted the mistakes, 
leaving me nowhere to turn to. I will cancel the decision. However, 
I shall not name an heir apparent for two or three years, during which 
time the empress may bear me a son. If she doesn't, only then will I 
appoint an heir apparent."9' The immediate crisis was resolved, but 
it took yet another eight years before the emperor finally named the 
eldest imperial son his successor.92 
88 The confrontation is recorded in Ming shih, biography of Wang Hsi-chueh, ch. 
218, p. 5752. 
89 Yueh Yuan-sheng, ch. 5, pp. 5b-7b. 
90 Ibid., ch. 5, p. 8a. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 761-762. 
91 Yiieh Yuian-sheng, ch. 5, p. 8a. Also see Ming shih, biography of Wang Hsi- 
chueh, ch. 218, p. 5752. 
92 The imperial edict was issued in the 1 0th month of Wan-li 29 (1601). So it had 
taken fifteen years to bring the issue to a closure. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 79, p. 4884. To 
argue that the Wan-li emperor's wish was not without justification from the stand- 
point of statutory or customary law, Ray Huang maintains that "had the emperor 
been governed by an independent judiciary and the throne submitted its proposal 
to the court, and had his wish been candidly presented and vigorously argued by 
jurists, chances are that the sovereign's case against the bureaucrats would have 
been won": see 1587, A rear of No Signzicance, p. 83, also pp. 84-85. Does not this 
author import modern criteria into a 16th century debate? We are dealing here with 
a traditional world in which ethics and the established codes of behavior played an 
important part in making the imperial power amenable to persuasion. In the eyes 
of many officials, the imperial succession was an exceedingly important institutional 
issue of which morality was an integral part. To assume a rigid distinction between 
a moral argument and a legal one seems anachronistic to me. It is important to maintain 
a sense of perspective about late Ming politics, keeping in mind that ethical discourse 
and institutional checks were carefully interwoven into a web of restraints to check 
imperial arbitrariness and irresponsibility. 
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The Grand Secretariat's Control over Censorate 
and Personnel 
The Kuo-pen controversy peaked between 1591 and 1593. To speak 
of blood on the floor of the court was hardly an exaggeration. Yet, 
for all the damage it caused, it was only part of the wrangling that 
raged for a decade and sapped the government. The conflict between 
the opposition and the Grand Secretariat boiled down to power and 
control. The opposition called for reforming the administrative struc- 
ture to the point where the Grand Secretariat would relinquish control 
over other government branches and share its responsibility and 
dec'sion-making power with them. This balanced relationship, they 
thought, would increase efficiency and keep both the throne and the 
Grand Secretariat in check. 
The opposition's advocacy of institutional checks as well as its 
uncompromising stand on principles caused Shen Shih-hsing and 
Wang Hsi-chueh tremendous stress and trouble. They were constantly 
under fire, challenged and embarrassed. Among the issues that kept 
the Grand Secretariat and the opposition at odds, the realignment 
of administrative authority was central. And at the core of the issue 
was the Grand Secretariat's relationship to the Ministry of Person- 
nel and to the censorial offices. 
The Ministry of Personnel controlled selection and appointment. 
The censorial-supervisory branch, which included a Chief Surveillance 
Office, thirteen Provincial Surveillance Offices, and the Six Offices 
of Scrutiny, ensured open avenues of criticism and exercised dis- 
ciplinary power to keep the government officials, including the grand 
secretaries, in check.93 The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel 
and of the censorial-supervisory branch inevitably created frictions 
with the Grand Secretariat. Powerful grand secretaries in the past 
decades had successfully reduced these agencies to a subordinate status. 
That Chang Chu-cheng could treat the minister of Personnel as if 
he were a humble clerk and maintain tight control over the censors 
exemplified his iron-fisted style.94 
But the Grand Secretariat was on the defensive after 1582. The 
opposition insisted that it take its hands off the Ministry of Person- 
nel and the censorial-supervisory branch so that they could exercise 
93 Ming shih, ch. 73, pp. 1767-1769; ch. 74, pp. 1805-1807. Also see Hsieh Kuo- 
chen, Minig-Ch'ing chih-chzi tang-sheytin-tung k'ao, pp. 4-5. Hucker, The Censorial System 
of Ming China, p. 9. 
94 Ting Yiian-chien, ch. 6, 171/29. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 639. 
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their duties fully. This might indeed alter existing political arrange- 
ments profoundly and lead to a further reducing of the Grand Se- 
cretariat's power. Unwilling to endorse, but unable to reject, this 
institutional challenge, Shen Shih-hsing chose to finesse it. Unlike 
Chang Chiu-cheng, he appeared congenial and deferential to his 
colleagues; he tolerated criticisms to a considerable degree, and he 
respected the decisions made by senior personnel officials and by 
censors. As a matter of fact, his allies held most of the senior posts in 
the central government. Networking was exceedingly useful for Shen 
Shih-hsing. Multiple ties included teacher-disciple and classmate (t'ung- 
nzen [p] *) relationships associated with the civil service examinations, 
regional affiliations, friendships, and marriages. They bound him and 
his associates together against the opposition, protecting their in- 
terests.95 It was through such alliances that Shen could temper the 
decisions of the Ministry of Personnel and manipulate the censorial- 
supervisory branch.96 His deference was just a cover.97 
The Grand Secretariat controlled by Shen Shih-hsing and Wang 
Hsi-chuieh clearly bore a Chiang-nan iI -A, or more precisely, a Su- 
chou V +11 character.98 The differences in their personalities com- 
plemented each other nicely. The soft-tempered Shen did not like 
to push his opponents too far. After he had transferred, demoted, or 
dismissed people, he often recalled some of them to government service. 
He was able to minimize personal animosity and enhance his own 
image of congeniality and generosity.99 Wang, on the other hand, 
was quick-tempered, stubborn and tough. If Shen was known for 
stepping back in face of the opposition's challenges, Wang actively 
engaged the attackers. The blending of their approaches gave the 
Grand Secretariat a nice guy, tough guy duality. 100 
Thus, the Grand Secretariat's relation to the Ministry of Person- 
nel and the censorial-supervisory branch remained somewhere between 
Chang Chui-cheng's authoritarian grip and the hands-off advocated 
by the opposition. Aggrieved and unconvinced, the opposition con- 
tinued its relentless probing and pounding. As Shen was to complain 
to a friend, "Administrative power has already been restored to the 
Six Ministries, so that I am not able to promote a person or take an 
95 For his Chiang-nan ties, see Jie Zhao, "Ties that Bind," p. 142. 
96 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ma Ying-t'u's memorial, 58/332. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 640. 
97 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 4, 41/47-48. 
98 YU Shen-hsing, ch. 8, p. 93. Shen and Wang were both natives of Su-chou. 
99 Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5749. 
100 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Li I-wan's memorial, 59/31. 
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initiative on my own. But I am still accused of having too much 
power. What should I do then? Should I stand by with my hands in 
the sleeves and my mouth shut?"101 Shen's correspondence depicts 
him as trapped in a predicament wherein his concessions could never 
be enough to satisfy the opposition. 
Nonetheless, a large number of often very long memorials by the 
opposition rebutted Shen's claim. For example, a memorial of 1585 
described the "consultation requirement" (ch'ing-chiao # L) in the 
following terms: "The censorial agencies are obligated to send re- 
ports to the senior grand secretary to receive his advice on the tone 
of their investigations and recommendations. Likewise, Personnel and 
other ministries send their reports to the senior grand secretary to 
seek his opinions on appointment and other matters." 102 Even when 
he was on sick leave, Shen Shih-hsing insisted that the ministers consult 
him at his residence before making decisions. 103 They did not exercise 
independent authority. 
To assert the consultation privilege, Shen Shih-hsing relied upon 
two sources of support: one was the Grand Secretariat-Personnel- 
Censorial network, of which he was the patron, and the other was 
imperial patronage, successfully cultivated since 1583. Despite the 
monarch's egotistic desires and hot temper, in dealing with the emperor 
Shen had no difficulty finding weak points where imperial authority 
could be turned to his advantage and thus a tacit agreement could 
be reached. Under Shen's administration the annual budget of the 
Palace Treasury had originally been about one million, but later he 
had it increased by 200,000 taels of silver. In addition, the huge 
expenses for the imperial birthdays and weddings, for palace renova- 
tions, and so forth, were met by the state, draining the public trea- 
sury.'04 The emperor in turn supported his senior grand secretary 
against the opposition. Furthermore, he granted Shen the privilege 
of sending him confidential memorandums, known as mi-chieh %J 
tJ. Indeed, given his infrequent participation in state affairs his infor- 
mation was very much limited to such confidential memorandums 
from his senior grand secretary. This made it easy for Shen to shape 
the emperor's opinions. As Ch'ien I-pen X -t , an active member 
101 Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 36, 134/752. 
102 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ma Ying-t'u's memorial, 58/333. 
103 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 540. 
104 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/246; Feng Ying-feng's memo- 
rial, 59/272. The Ministry of Revenue submitted several memorials in 1588 report- 
ing the fiscal deficit and urging the emperor to restrain himself with regard to lavish 
spending, but to no avail. See Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 409-410, 411-413. 
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of the opposition, pointed out in a memorial of 1591, the emperor 
entrusted Shen with the power to draft and issue imperial edicts on 
his behalf. Nine out of every ten decisions, all bearing the imperial 
imprint, were in fact made by the senior grand secretary.'05 
To illustrate Shen Shih-hsing's hold on other government bran- 
ches, Ch'ien I-pen chose the minister of Rites as an example. The 
latter was not affiliated with the inner circle of the senior grand 
secretary. Nevertheless, in selecting the chief examiners for the pro- 
vincial examinations, he discussed the selection with the senior grand 
secretary, not once but twice. Ch'ien commented: "For this decision 
alone, he had to consult the senior grand secretary twice to make 
sure he did not miss his hints." In short, even an unaffiliated man 
could not resist the pressure, to say nothing of ministers who willingly 
humbled themselves to the senior grand secretary.106 
The Grand Secretariat's relation to the Ministry of Personnel was 
the key to its ability to exert authority over the six ministries. It was 
mutually beneficial to the senior grand secretary and the minister of 
Personnel to maintain a cozy collaboration. An opposition member 
put it bluntly: "Take a look at senior grand secretaries. Which of 
them hasn't pursued his selfish interests by manipulating Personnel? 
Take a look at the ministers of Personnel. Which of them hasn't visited 
the senior grand secretary's office and private residence to please 
him? The senior grand secretary takes advantage [of his influence 
on the Ministry of Personnel] to take bribes, while in return he allows 
the minister to serve for a long time. Above all, the senior grand 
secretary and the minister of Personnel team up to engage in thievery. 
What public good is served by this?"'07 This critique was directed 
specifically at the relationship between Shen Shih-hsing and Yang 
Wei %X(1514-1605), the then minister of Personnel.108 
"Thievery" caught the essence of power politics. Power and profit 
fueled the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, which 
distributed desirable appointments and other favors and tolerated 
bribery and corruption.'09 The oversight system was bankrupt, and 
105 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/246. 
106 Ibid., 58/246. The minister of Rites was Yu Shen-hsing h:I'H(1545-1608). 
See Ono Kazuko, Minki tdsha k6', pp. 19 1-197. 
107 Yi K'ung-chien, Yuan-hsuieh-chai i-y u, ch. 3, p. 62b. 
108 For Yang Wei's collaboration with Shen Shih-hsing, see Chao Yung-hsien, 
ch. 28, 41/439. Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'en T'ai-lai's memorial, 58/365. Mingshih, biog- 
raphy of Sung Hsun, ch. 224, p. 5890. 
109 Wan Kuo-ch'in, Wan Er-yiu hsien-sheng i-chi, ch. 1, 78/10-14. In his memorial, 
Wan pointed out that the high-ranking generals used the defense budget to bribe 
Shen Shih-hsing. The memorial is also included in Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/21-24. 
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institutional checks were inoperative. It was such conditions that gave 
free reign to officials like Yang Wen-chu 4t i X (cs. 1577).11o 
In 1589, Chiang-nan suffered a terrible drought and famine. An 
imperial edict authorized the distribution of 200,000 taels of silver 
to Nan-chih-li and 100,000 taels to Che-chiang as a relief fund. This 
distribution was assigned to Shen Shih-hsing's protege Yang Wen- 
chii, the right supervising secretary of Revenue. 1 With such a huge 
sum at his disposal, he seized the opportunity. The bulk of the fund 
went to pay for Yang's extravagant parties with local Chiang-nan 
officials and to finance the expensive gifts he received from them. 
Little was left to rescue the starving from widespread famine. Many 
years later, Ting Yuan-chien T j , a native of Che-chiang and 
an upright scholar-official, still felt indignation as he recalled this 
scandal: "Ordinary people in Chiang-nan have a fresh memory of 
what Yang did to them. They hate him so much that they wish they 
could tear him to pieces and eat all his flesh and bones."'"12 
When Yang Wen-chu returned to the capital, it was no secret that 
he had made a fortune from his assignment. But no disciplinary action 
was taken against him. To the contrary, he was soon promoted to 
be chief supervising secretary of Personnel. "I3 In other words, a man 
who should have been brought to justice now held a powerful posi- 
tion in the censorial-supervisory system. 
In a memorial of 1591, T'ang Hsien-tsu , a secretary of 
Rites at Nanking, brought up Yang's corruption, saying: "The three 
grand secretaries (i.e., Shen Shih-hsing, Wang Hsi-chuieh, and Hsu 
Kuo) are natives of Su-chou and Hui-chou jt )I'I. (Yang) Wen-chui's 
avarice is well known in these two prefectures. How is it possible 
that these grand secretaries have not learned about it? It is indeed 
unbelievable that Yang now ranks high in the Six Offices of Scru- 
tiny! " I4 For these remarks T'ang was demoted to county clerk in a 
remote region. 115 
I "0Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 4, 41/47. Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Chang Ying-yang's memo- 
rial, 59/124-126; Yang Ting-lan's memorial, 59/128. 
111 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 465. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 644. 
112 Ting Yuan-chien, ch. 1, 170/659. 
113 Shen Te-fu, p. 1317. The chief supervising secretary of Personnel held the 
most powerful position in the Six Offices of Scrutiny. Yang was promoted to that 
position in 1590. See Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 523. 
114 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, T'ang Hsien-tsu's memorial, 58/260-263. 
115 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 552. Also see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4649. The dismissal of 
T'ang Hsien-tsu only prompted more critical memorials. In the end, a memorial by 
Chang Shou-ch'eng brought down Yang, who was cashiered in late 1591. His patron 
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The reading public in the two capitals captured glimpses of the 
spectacle through unofficial essays, plays, stories, and satires. The 
anonymous writers of these works seemingly either had access to high 
circles or were themselves insiders. One satire, circulating in the 
capital at this time, depicted a distinctive feature of Peking politics, 
namely, how the chief servants of the powerful officials handled back- 
door deals. The satire, entitled "The Biography of Five, Seven and 
Nine," identified Chang Chiu-cheng's servant Yu Ch'i r -L, Shen 
Shih-hsing's servant Shen Chiu F@ tL, and Wang Hsi-chiieh's ser- 
vant Wang Wu E E as big bribe-takers and influential behind-the- 
scene brokers."6 T'ang Hsien-tsu's memorial did point out that Shen 
Chiu had played a decisive role in securing the position of chief 
supervising secretary of Personnel for Yang Wen-chti."7 
When he joined the Grand Secretariat, Wang Hsi-chuieh had made 
a solemn oath to eschew cheating, favoritism, and bribery, to the 
applause of his colleagues. One Chiang-nan friend praised him as 
incorruptible.I"" But his own financial history told a different story. 
A student with little wealth to start with, Wang not only achieved 
great success in his career, but also great affluence. He was one of 
the richest men in his native Su-chou. His servant Wang Wu, a 
character in the satire, accumulated a large fortune as well."'' 
The Yang Wen-chui scandal was just the tip of the iceberg. It was 
a practice for Shen Shih-hsing, a protective patron, to appoint his 
men to desirable and lucrative assignments and shelter the corrupt 
from prosecution. His proteges in turn manned the front line, attacking 
his opponents and protecting his interests.120 As Ch'ien Ch'ien-i X 
Shen Shih-hsing had stepped down by then. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 58/670-671. Wan- 
1i ti-ch'ao, p. 575. 
116 Shen Te-fu, p. 628. Shen Te-fu suspected Yu Shen-hsing to be the author of 
this satire. According to him, Shen Shih-hsing blocked Yu from joining the Grand 
Secretariat. He wrote his satire, therefore, to expose the dirt and ridicule in the way 
politics were played out behind the scenes in the hands of a few servants. The focus 
of the satire was Shen Shih-hsing's chief servant Shen Chiu (sometimes also called 
by his birth name, Sung Chiu). In his memorial, Li I-wan described Shen Chiu's 
role in taking bribes and his connections with eunuchs: see Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/28. 
117 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, T'ang Hsien-tsu's memorial, 58/262. 
'18Shen Te-fu, p. 620. 
119Wu Yuan-ts'ui, ch'i-chi, ch. 2, p. 467. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 81, p. 5028. 
120 Shen Shih-hsing's most aggressive henchmen were called the "three sheep (a 
pun on the surname Yang) and eight dogs." Yang Wen-chut was one of the three 
sheep. Yu Shen-hsing, ch. 12, p. 128. Shen Te-fu, p. 2321. Also see Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 
Chang Na-pi's memorial, 58/371; Chang Shou-ch'eng's memorial, 58/670-671; Li 
T'ien-lin's memorial, 58/672-674. 
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=-"t t (1582-1664) was to say, ''OfElcials working for Chiang-ling aI 
0 (i.e., Chang Chu-cheng) were competent horses, whereas officials 
affiliated with the grand secretaries after Chang were shrewd foxes 
and cunning rats.''12l This late Ming observation depicts "foxes" and 
"rats" destroying the institutional and ethical foundation of the state. 
When a modern scholar contrasts Shen Shih-hsing's incerity and 
humility with Chang Chu-cheng's arrogance, asserting that Chang 
"tended to overlook the larger issues and in the end evolved into the 
kind of man Mencius had described as capable of seeing the barbs 
of a feather but unable to visualize a cartload of faggots,''122 we can 
only disagree. It is important, in this regard, to be reminded of Hai 
Jui's assessment at the time: Chang Chu-cheng had a great talent 
for managing state afEairs, but was not good at protecting his own 
interests ()! E I 5 =n= g , tS 9 = X). 123 The reverse could actually 
be said of Shen Shih-hsing. 
Institutional Erosion 
Shen Shih-hsing inherited from Chang Chu-cheng efficient ma- 
nagement of state afEairs, well-guarded frontiers, sound fiscal policies, 
and overflowing treasuries. 124 By 1591, after nine years as Senior C;rand 
Secretary, he left behind a government crippled by partisan politics, 
maladministration, corruption, deficits, frontier defense failures, and, 
more dreadfully, by the breakdown of the procedural checks on 
imperial irresponsibility and arbitrariness.125 
In a letter to Left Censor-in-chiefLi Shih-ta t2(1531-1599), 
Chao Yung-hsien blamed Shen's administration for this appalling 
disintegration and called Li's attention to the problems that afilicted 
the Censorate. That institution, in Chao's opinion, had over the recent 
decade been reduced to the Grand Secretariat's partisan tool, blocking 
the opposition from reprimanding the administration for its miscon- 
duct. "The Censorate is obliged to investigate and impeach wrongdoing 
so as to keep officials under discipline," he recalled; but, contrary to 
their duty, the censors only went after outspoken officials. "If someone 
l2lCh'ien Ch'ien-i, ch. 30, p. 895 
122 Ray Huang, 1587, A Lear of J\lo Signficance, ch. 2., p. 61, and also see p. 53, 
p. 59. 
123 Tran Ch'ien, ch. 71, p. 4415. 
124 Hsia Hsieh, ch. 67, p. 2638. Also see Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement of 
the Late Ming period," p. 132. 
l25Wang Chia-p'ing, ch. 8, 149/714. Tan Ch'ien, ch. 72, p. 4441 
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criticizes a powerful official and touches a nerve, that person is 
immediately attacked by a gang of censors. Isn't it preposterous when 
the chief of the Censorate fails to discipline these censors? Worse 
than that, he himselfjumps in and backs up the attackers, claiming 
that he does so in order to protect the dignity of senior officials."'26 
Turning to the sanctions, Chao stated that the Ming Statutes permitted 
all officials to speak honestly and frankly. Wang Chen i J& and Liu 
Chin Wj f, for all their abuse and brutality, dared not openly forbid 
officials from speaking out. 127 It was unprecedented for this adminis- 
tration to create sanctions in order to prohibit junior officials from 
expressing their views. 
Furthermore, the administration also withheld critical memorials 
from being filed in the official gazetteers. Chao argued, "From ancient 
times, critical views about state and society, even though not accepted 
on the moment, have been documented in the official records for 
the purpose of informing the later generations of the wisdom and 
intelligent opinions in the past." Now the administration disregarded 
this tradition and issued the ban out of fear of the exposure of its 
wrongdoing. 
The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, as Chao saw 
it, provided a sanctuary for corruption, a disease that weakened 
institutional practices and political ethics more rapidly than ever before. 
Corruption in the Censorate was not just the failure of one office or 
an isolated case, such as a failure of the Grand Secretariat. Charged 
as it was with the enormous responsibility of searching out illegal 
activities in officialdom, the Censorate itself committed corruption 
and bribery. These were offices that used their power to engage in 
all sorts of unethical transactions, with the connivance of powerful 
patrons. 
Taking censorial inspection as example, Chao said the following: 
There is a strict and orderly procedure for scheduling provincial inspection 
assignments. When Chiang-ling (i.e. Chang Chu-cheng) was in power, the 
procedure was observed. But lobbying for assignment is common nowadays. 
The intimate and deceitful are sent to near and profitable provinces, while 
the honest and unconnected are assigned to the far and difficult... Isn't it 
126 Chao Yung-hsien alluded to Wu Shih-lai, the former Left Censor-in-chief 
under Shen's administration. 
127Wang Chen in the 1440s and Liu Chin in the early 1550s were powerful eunuchs 
who terrorized the officialdom through the Eastern and Western Depots, the impe- 
rial secret services. Ming shih, ch. 304, section on Wang Chen, pp. 7772-7774, and 
section on Liu Chin, pp. 7786-7792. 
This content downloaded from 130.111.46.40 on Fri, 3 May 2013 15:37:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A DECADE OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE 143 
absurd that the Censorate, the office in charge of oversight, takes the lead in 
breaking the rules? As for investigations, the central government relies upon 
its inspectors as ears and eyes to report the performance of local officials. 
Inspectors today frequently receive secret instructions [from their patrons] 
before their trip as to which matters they should investigate. If local officials 
do not bend, they manufacture evidence against them and block their pro- 
motions... As a result, men of integrity and ability are put down; those on 
the fast track are all affiliated with the powerful." 
Corruption was running rampant within the Censorate. "In the 
past, censors on inspection were forbidden to bring back any item 
after their tours of duty. Even twenty or thirty years ago there was 
no such a thing as a censor on inspection bribing powerful officials 
in Peking to the tune of several hundred taels of silver. But it is not 
unusual now.... So the bookcases in their return boats are filled with 
gold and jewelry... Above all, it is now customary to pass gifts as 
gratitude for recommendations, awards, upcoming appointments, 
evaluations, etc. Prefects and magistrates are running around day 
and night looking for ways to meet these demands. How can they be 
expected to observe ethical principles and not abuse the common 
people to line their pockets?" 128 
Chao Yung-hsien's letter raised serious concerns about the de- 
teriorating health of the dynasty. He feared that the government 
would be heading for disaster if no serious measures were taken to 
repair the corrupt censorial-supervisory system. The Grand Secre- 
tariat, in this view, was the problem, not the solution. The opposition 
now became more convinced than ever that the answer lay in ini- 
tiatives by the six ministries to reform the dysfunctional institutions. 
To that end, the Grand Secretariat must relinquish control over them. 
Surely the opposition saw it as an encouraging sign when the Secreta- 
riat-Personnel-Censorial alliance in effect collapsed: in 1590 and 1591 
its three key members, Minister of Personnel Yang Wei, Left Censor- 
in-chiefWu Shih-lai, and Shen Shih-hsing himself, all had to resign.129 
Shen Shih-hsing had seen the Ministry of Personnel drifting away 
after the resignation of Yang Wei. Before he left office, he searched 
for a cooperative minister of Personnel and gambled on Lu Kuang- 
tsu FW $l (1521-1597). Lu's disagreement with the opposition on 
a few occasions, his political skills, and his solid reputation in offi- 
cialdom made him seem the right man for the job. Shen badly needed 
a competent ally to assist him in reinvigorating his shattered admi- 
128 Chao Yung-hsien, Chao's letter, ch. 28, 41/438-440. 
129Yang and Wu resigned in 1590; Shen stepped down in 1591. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 
75, p. 4623, p. 4627. 
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nistration and pacifying the opposition.'30 With his strong support, 
Lu was appointed Minister of Personnel in 1591. 
But Lu Kuang-tsu proved to be a huge disappointment to Shen 
Shih-hsing. The new minister was interested in restoring the dignity 
and authority of his office, paying little heed to the "consultation 
privilege" that the Senior Grand Secretary had enjoyed for years. 
What troubled the Senior Grand Secretary even more were Lu's 
personnel initiatives: Shen's opponents, ousted years ago, were now 
recalled, and a number of officials affiliated with his faction were 
either transferred or demoted. With such independent actions by Lu, 
the institutional challenge now returned to the spotlight and Shen 
could only express his regret. As he told Wang Hsi-chuieh, "I was 
fooled by this bald old man!"'131 
Lu Kuang-tsu presided over the 1592 triennial "great reckoning," 
that is, the evaluation of all the officials outside the capital. Aided by 
Left Censor-in-chief Li Shih-ta, he promoted twenty-two officials who 
had a strong record of competence and moral character, and demoted 
or dismissed several officials infamous for corruption, most of whom 
were affiliated with the faction of the Grand Secretariat.'32 For the 
first time in the decade, the Minister of Personnel and Left Censor- 
in-chief worked together to reform their offices and oversee this 
important occasion without any scandals. 
These two senior officials were not affiliated with the opposition. 
Yet, their exercise of authority propelled them into the thick of par- 
ti-san fighting: they provoked the Grand Secretariat by their 
"defection" and received warm applause from the opposition. Keenly 
aware of the circumstances, Lu forced himself not to let personal 
likes and dislikes blind his judgement and temper his decisions.'33 
130 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/30. 
131 Ibid., ch. 6, 171/31. Wang Hsi-chueh expressed his negative view of Lu Kuang- 
tsu in a letter to Ku Hsien-ch'eng: Wang Hsi-chueh, ch. 18, 136/171-172. This let- 
ter is also included in Ku's Ching-kao ts'ang-kao, ch. 3, 1292/29-30. 
132 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/31. As a crucial part of the appointment and 
evaluation system of the Ming, all the officials outside the capital were subject to 
evaluation every three years, known as the triennial "great reckoning," or ta-chi 7k 
=t. All the officials in the capital below fourth rank were subjected to a similar evalu- 
ation every six years, known as the sexennial capital evaluation, or ching-ch'a f W. 
The Ministry of Personnel and the Censorate conducted these evaluations. See Ta- 
Ming hui-tien, ch. 209, p. 482. Shen Te-fu, p. 800, p. 2240. Also see Pierre-Etienne 
Will, "Creation, conflict, and routinization: appointing officials by drawing lots, 1594- 
1700," p. 5. 
133 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/31. Also see Ming shih, biography of Lu Kuang- 
tsu, ch. 224, p. 5893. 
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And yet, despite his effort to carry out the 1592 great reckoning fairly 
and judiciously, and precisely because he stood firmly on principle, 
he caused much agitation in the Grand Secretariat. He was soon 
pushed out of office.'34 
Although it got rid of Lu Kuang-tsu, the Grand Secretariat failed 
to resolve the frictions with the Ministry of Personnel. The next 
minister, Sun Lung J* j (1525-1594), was even tougher to deal with. 
Sun presided over the 1593 sexennial evaluation of capital officials 
with the aide of Chao Nan-hsing ( M (1550-1628), the director 
of the Bureau of Appointments. The stakes on both sides were very 
high, since the capital evaluations "could result in drastic changes of 
personnel at the higher echelons and mark the onset of new policies."'135 
The 1593 capital evaluations proceeded strictly under the direc- 
tion of the Minister of Personnel, independent of the Grand Se- 
cretariat's influence. To ensure the integrity of the evaluations, Sun 
Lung and Chao Nan-hsing applied the strict rules to themselves first, 
by demoting their own relatives. After this, no one dared to tamper 
with the process. 136 Their report went directly to the emperor, without 
any consultation of the Grand Secretariat; and it came as no sur- 
prise that among the dismissed and demoted were favorites of the 
grand secretaries.137 
The 1593 capital evaluation challenged the decades-old practice 
following which the Grand Secretariat, not the Ministry of Person- 
nel, always called the shots on important personnel decisions. 138 Wang 
Hsi-chuieh, who was now Senior Grand Secretary, felt threatened as 
Sun Lung and Chao Nan-hsing could now rally the six ministries to 
free themselves from the Grand Secretariat's influence, a cause which 
the opposition had long advocated. To eliminate this threat, he turned 
to the emperor for support. An imperial edict was issued, reproaching 
Sun Lung for arbitrary use of authority and dismissing Chao Nan- 
hsing. The edict prompted Sun Lung to submit his resignation.'39 
134 Lu's tenure lasted less than a year. Ming shih, biography of Lu Kuang-tsu, 
ch. 224, pp. 5892-5893. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4669. 
135 Will, "Creation, conflict, and routinization," p. 5. 
136 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'en T'ai-lai's memorial, 58/365. 
137 Ibid., 58/364; Chia Yen's memorial, 58/367. Also see Ming shih, biography of 
Sun Lung, ch. 224, pp. 5894-5895. 
138 WU Ytian-ts'ui, ch. 1, p. 4 1. 
139In the epitaph he wrote for Sun Lung, Chao Nan-hsing described the 1593 
capital evaluation and the Grand Secretariat's retaliation: Chao Nan-hsing, ch. 14, 
68/401-403. Also see Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 729-730. Ming shih, ch. 224, p. 5895. 
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Unlike Shen Shih-hsing, Wang Hsi-chuieh did not care much for 
the niceties of politics; he pulled up his sleeves and went after his 
opponents. Chao Yung-hsien, before being forced out of government, 
had predicted that vicious attacks upon upright officials would not 
stop until they were all driven out of government.'40 Playing rough, 
however, only increased the tension between the Grand Secretariat, 
the Ministry of Personnel, and the opposition.'4' Their continuous 
strife further undermined an already fractured government, ushering 
in a far more aggressive and destructive phase of factionalism. With 
a battle looming, Wang Hsi-chiieh considered he had had enough; 
he resigned from government in 1594.142 
Conclusion 
Chang Chui-cheng passed away in 1582 with no sense of foreboding. 
But confidence and order, the hallmarks of his administration, eva- 
porated quickly in the following decade. In the writings of literati 
nostalgia for the past and worry for the future were blended to convey 
a sense of insecurity and uncertainty.'43 Indeed, by the end of the 
decade anxiety and recklessness had already permeated the official 
world, and they would soon trickle down through society. 
This poignant and gloomy sentiment echoed the rapid disintegration 
that had been taking place in the higher spheres of Ming government 
during the decade of 1583-1593. For the sake of their political survival 
Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chiieh winked at the Wan-li emperor's 
tearing down of the web of restraints. This enabled them to secure 
imperial support for the managerial power they exercised over other 
government branches. Stained by corruption scandals, obstruction 
of the ground rules, and subservience to the emperor, Shen and his 
140 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 31, 41/467. Wang Hsi-chueh's retaliation was fierce. 
About sixty officials were cashiered as a result. See Wen Ping, ch. 3, p. 179. For 
Wang's involvement in forcing Chao out of government, see Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'en 
T'ai-lai's memorial, 58/366. Wu Yuian-ts'ui, ch. 5, pp. 162-163. Wen Ping, ch. 3, 
pp. 170-175. Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, ch. 62, p. 1471. 
141 The dismissal of Chao Nan-hsing and Sun Lung's resignation outraged the 
opposition. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/369-370; Chang Na- 
pi's memorial, 58/371-374; and Kao P'an-lung's memorial, 58/375-376. Wen Ping, 
ch. 3, p. 161, viewed the 1593 dispute about the capital evaluation as a cause for 
further escalating partisan rancor and criticized Wang Hsi-chiieh for it. 
142 Wang Hsi-chuoeh resigned in the 5th month of Wan-li 22; his tenure as senior 
grand secretary had lasted a year and a half. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4730. 
143 See Timothy Brook, T7he Confusions of Pleasure, pp. 1- 13. 
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associates provided the opposition with ample ammunition to discredit 
them on institutional and ethical grounds. The agitated administra- 
tion in turn punished its critics by means of demotion, dismissal or 
transfer. As a result, the emperor's caprices and the partisan struggles 
between the Grand Secretariat and the opposition together destroyed 
the balance crucial for a reasonable management of state affairs. 
Upon reflecting on the fall of the Ming, Huang Tsung-hsi 
X (1610-1695) stated that the origin of misrule under the Ming lay 
in the abolition of the prime ministership: "After the prime ministership 
was abolished, the moment an emperor was succeeded by an unworthy 
son there was no worthy person at all to whom one could turn for 
help. Then how could even the idea of dynastic succession be main- 
tained?" 144 The compilers of Ming shih, for their part, held the senior 
grand secretaries accountable for the disintegration. Yet for all their 
culpability, we must recognize the potential perils of their situation. 
The senior grand secretaries were held hostage by T'ai-tsu's institu- 
tions, which assured the ultimate power of the throne. Operating in 
a system that did not allow for prime ministership, they were vulnerable 
both to imperial rage and to the opposition's criticisms. Motivated 
by the survival instinct, the senior grand secretaries served the emperor 
humbly, with "the mind of a eunuch or palace maid."'145 
The opposition, using T'ai-tsu's abolition of the prime ministership 
to justify its cause, wished to devolve the managerial power of the 
Grand Secretariat to the six ministries. In a situation where the emperor 
was aloof from state affairs and abused his power arbitrarily, the 
devolution of the Grand Secretariat's managerial power was a recipe 
for destroying the already very fragile unity of the government. Given 
the fact that none of the six ministries was able to replace the Grand 
Secretariat by taking over its policy-making and managerial respon- 
sibilities, to nullify the Grand Secretariat was bound to lead to chaos. 
With this in mind, and as the disintegration accelerated after 1593, 
it was not difficult to anticipate the end result. The power struggle 
between the Grand Secretariat and the Ministry of Personnel paved 
the way for a savage war of factionalism. When the Wan-li reign 
approached its end the Grand Secretariat had become utterly dys- 
functional. Yeh Hsiang-kao , [pJ E` (1559-1627), the senior grand 
secretary at the time, could only lament that "the senior grand 
secretary today is very much like the head of beggars, using up all 
144 Huang Tsung-hsi, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, transl. deBary, pp. 
101-102. 
145 Ibid., p. 95. 
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of his energy to keep his voice as loud as possible in begging for 
food. Yet his fellow beggars, still unsatisfied, yell at him for not raising 
his voice even louder." 146 Yeh's remark is sad testimony to the struggles 
which devoured not only the Grand Secretariat but also the entire 
central bureaucracy. The warring factions cleared the way for the 
rise of the eunuch party. 
The fateful legacy of T'ai-tsu's institutions was precisely the extent 
of his desire to grasp power for the throne alone, which inevitably 
sapped the quality of the central bureaucracy.'47 Thus, the decade 
1583-1593 was a turning point in shaping the fate of the Ming dynasty. 
An unworthy emperor and his unworthy senior grand secretaries 
wrangled with the opposition, the only force that cried out for con- 
taining the spread of the illness. The opposition brought down the 
senior grand secretaries and discredited the Grand Secretariat, but 
it could not break through the gridlock and was unable to renovate 
the government. "Since partisan wrangling could only be resolved 
by one clique's winning imperial favor and ousting its adversaries 
from positions of influence, these struggles served merely to weaken 
the officialdom's resistance to the irregularities of the emperor and 
his eunuch favorites."' 48 This consuming and destructive process 
continued until the dynasty was brought to an end. 
146Huang Ching-fang, Kuo-shih wei-i, p. 685. 
147 YUi Shen-hsing, ch. 6, p. 64. 
148 Hucker, 7he Censorial System of Ming China, p. 46. 
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